一人游 Talk.01 Solo Journey Talk.01 第 04 篇 Section 04
流行乐观察 Pop Music Observations
返回 一人游 Talk.01 Back to Solo Journey Talk.01本文目录 Contents
10、欧美流行乐观察：以 Olivia Rodrigo《GUTS》为中心 Western Pop Observations: Centering on Olivia Rodrigo’s GUTS
在路上完整听了一遍《GUTS》，太美了。这张专辑在保持上一张特点的同时，展现了 Olivia Rodrigo 两年间的思考与成长，也展现了她声音的故事性和可塑性——用朋克夹杂弦乐，呈现她美好而复杂的十九岁世界，歌词写尽了美国Z世代的青春时光。全专几乎没有明显的弱曲。首专《SOUR》是从EP扩充为正规专辑的，配置一般；这张则直接拉满，而且非常适合她。Pitchfork给出了8.0分的乐评，我认为实至名归（来源：Pitchfork）。
Listening through GUTS in its entirety on transit, it was breathtakingly sublime. While preserving the strengths of her debut, the album demonstrates Olivia Rodrigo’s artistic evolution and contemplation across two years, showcasing the narrative ductility and expressive elasticity of her vocals—fusing punk with orchestral strings to portray her radiant, messy nineteen-year-old universe, lyrics depicting the youth of American Gen Z. The tracklist is devoid of filler. Debut album SOUR was retrofitted from an EP with modest production backing; GUTS firing on all cylinders is tailor-made for her artistic identity. Pitchfork awarded an 8.0 review score, thoroughly deserved in my estimation (Source: Pitchfork).
她才刚满20岁——错过了20岁的麦当娜、20岁的布兰妮、20岁的泰勒·斯威夫特，请不要再错过20岁的她。
She has just turned twenty—having missed Madonna at twenty, Britney Spears at twenty, and Taylor Swift at twenty, do not miss Olivia Rodrigo at twenty.
这张专辑的完整性在新生代中数一数二。特别是在2022年一大批资深歌手集体回春之后，Olivia Rodrigo 与 Charli XCX、Billie Eilish 等人一起，宣告了超新生代的喷薄而出。她走红也有时代背景：她出道时被称为”下一个白人天后”，因为此前欧美乐坛已经很久没有出现大红的白人女歌手了。
The thematic cohesion of this record ranks among the finest of her generation. Especially following the collective renaissance of veteran icons in 2022, Olivia Rodrigo alongside Charli xcx and Billie Eilish heralds the surging arrival of an even newer generation. Her ascent also rides socio-cultural tailwinds: hailed at debut as the “next white pop main girl,” emerging after Western pop had endured a long drought of breakout Caucasian female stars.
更宏观地看，广义上的另类音乐（Alternative）连同一些流派音乐，正在蚕食传统流行乐的市场——从近两年的格莱美和Billboard榜单可以看出端倪，音乐审美取向与特朗普执政时期已经完全不同。相比之下，K-pop式的”美国女团”风格过于标准化，个人特色不强，欧美市场未必买账。
From a macro lens, alternative music in the broadest sense, along with certain genre-based forms of music, is steadily devouring traditional mainstream pop market share—trends legible across recent Grammy ceremonies and Billboard charts, displaying aesthetic orientations starkly divergent from the Trump administration era. In contrast, K-pop’s sanitized attempts at “American girl groups” appear overly formulaic and devoid of distinct individualism, finding tough traction in Western markets.
欧美与韩国的发行逻辑也不同。K-pop发的是先行曲，服务于主打曲的风格概念；欧美则是越先发的越主打——专辑曲目多时可能有四五首主打，依次为第一主打、第二主打。宣发上欧美还有一手：先发普通版，一个月后再发豪华版，加几首新曲、换一个包装，再收割一波热度；没想到的是豪华版的加曲质量也如此之高。此外，欧美歌手的发片周期普遍很长，一般两三年憋出一张专辑：Justin Bieber五年一发，Adele七年，Ariana Grande至今没有消息。
Release rollouts also operate on conflicting logics between West and East. K-pop drops pre-release tracks to scaffold the title track’s stylistic lore; Western pop pushes early singles as lead anthems—albums may cycle through four or five singles as primary, secondary, and tertiary thrusts. Western promo also deploys standard commercial sequencing: drop the standard edition, followed a month later by a deluxe iteration packing bonus tracks and new packaging to harvest renewed momentum; astounding here is that GUTS deluxe tracks maintain stunning quality. Furthermore, Western album incubation cycles are notoriously prolonged: Justin Bieber releases once every five years, Adele takes seven, while Ariana Grande remains radio silent.
Troye Sivan今年终于要发第三张录音室专辑了——他是”乐评魔王”，音乐质量特别高，出道专辑在那两年的口碑仅次于 The Weeknd 的《After Hours》（后者的收录曲如今是Spotify全球播放量第一），基本是新生代男歌手前三；不过他离谱之处在于属于少数”中国火、世界不火”的歌手，上一张EP商业表现相当失败，成绩要看这张专辑。顺带一提，华语和K-pop都缺少权威乐评体系，还是希望能有一个，找歌时可以参考。
Troye Sivan is finally releasing his third studio album this year—he is a critical darling of exceptional sonic caliber, his debut enjoying acclaim in its era rivaled only by The Weeknd’s After Hours (one of whose tracks is now the most-streamed song globally on Spotify), cementing him in the top three of new-generation male vocalists. Yet his paradox lies in being among the few artists “wildly popular in China but muted globally,” his previous EP a commercial misfire, placing all stakes on this LP. Incidentally, both Mandopop and K-pop sorely lack authoritative music review infrastructures; having a benchmark would immensely aid curation.
11、邓紫棋演唱会观察 Observations from the G.E.M. Concert
邓紫棋的演唱会一共三个半小时，本身相当过瘾——韩娱的演唱会一般只有两小时左右，不过韩娱胜在氛围感更好。
G.E.M.’s concert spanned three and a half hours, intrinsically exhilarating—Korean pop concerts typically clock around two hours, though K-pop concerts triumph in superior atmospheric immersion.
真正让人无语的是观众构成。内场好多人纯粹是来”听个响”的，完全不是粉丝：他们一句不会跟唱，甚至在玩手机；还有不少男性根本不是歌迷，纯粹是陪女朋友或妻子来的。演唱会流程他们也不了解——我后排有人连安可环节都不知道，以为演唱会已经结束，实际上还有二三十分钟的安可。
What proved utterly disheartening was audience demographics. Many floor-seat attendees were casual onlookers seeking general entertainment rather than genuine fans: unable to sing along to a single verse, glued to their phones throughout; numerous men were not listeners at all, merely chaperoning girlfriends or spouses. They were oblivious to concert convention—attendees behind me did not even understand the concept of an encore, assuming the lights meant finale when twenty to thirty minutes of music remained.
由此我修正了一个预设：原以为内场粉丝浓度更高，现场发现看台的粉丝才更多，看台的声音比内场大得多。原因在于购票逻辑不同：有些粉丝是追着演唱会跑的，场场不落，他们把钱花在每场的通勤上，对座位要求不高；而内场的大多数人抱着”就听这一次，那就选个好座位”的心态来——我自己也是如此。
This shattered a preconception: I had assumed floor seats harbored the highest fan density, only to discover the tiered stands housed the true devotees, roaring far louder than the floor. This stems from divergent purchasing calculations: diehard fans tour across cities attending multiple stops, budgeting their funds for travel rather than premium seating; whereas floor buyers often adopt the mentality of “attending only this once, so splurge on prime seats”—a category including myself.
最尴尬的一幕是互动环节。邓紫棋问”你们还想听什么歌呀”，我们那一片只有我和另一个小哥喊着回答，其他人像被静音了一样。只能说邓紫棋太大众了——夸张点讲，蛮多人只知道《光年之外》和《泡沫》就来听演唱会了。
The most cringeworthy beat was the interactive segment. When G.E.M. asked “What songs do you want to hear next?”, only myself and another guy in our entire section shouted requests; everyone else stood muted. G.E.M. is simply too universally mainstream—exaggeration aside, many attended knowing little beyond “Light Years Away” and “Bubbles.”
下次想听一个小众一点的音乐人：氛围应该会更好，票价也更便宜。
Next time I wish to attend a somewhat less mainstream artist’s concert: the communion would be richer, and tickets far more reasonable.
12、K-pop 相关 K-Pop Observations
代际划分刍议 Remarks on Generational Demarcation
《Without Me》与红毛的《Psycho》原是同期的歌——原来我在听这首时，你们正在听那首。本想找找男团有什么好歌，结果被安利了 BIGBANG ；百首歌单里较新的男团似乎只有”档、迷、划”，两相比较，更显 权志龙 的厉害。
Halsey’s “Without Me” and Red Velvet’s “Psycho” were contemporaries—while I was immersed in the former, others were streaming the latter. Seeking standout boy group tracks, I was steered toward BIGBANG; across hundred-track playlists, newer boy groups were limited to TXT, Stray Kids, and NCT—the comparison only illuminated how impressive G-Dragon is.
我认为 K-pop 没有必要机械划代，尤其不该像中国粉圈这样 几乎每四年划一代 ——老一代偶像并不会因此消失。中文语境的”一代人”相隔二三十年，伴随无数生活习惯的变化；K-pop 在中国却被严格按年代切分，多少有些奇怪。
I see little merit in rigidly demarcating K-pop generations, particularly Chinese fandom’s obsession with carving a new generation every four years—veteran idols do not magically vanish. In Chinese sociolinguistics, a “generation” spans twenty to thirty years accompanied by seismic lifestyle shifts; that K-pop is sliced by four-year brackets feels bizarrely artificial.
韩国官方白皮书 的划分依据是追星方式、运营模式、核心团体、主要市场与国际影响力的质变 ，而非组合出道时间：
The South Korean Official K-Pop White Paper anchors its taxonomy in qualitative transformations across fandom behavior, operational models, flagship groups, core markets, and global impact, rather than arbitrary debut years:
| 代际 Generation | 时间节点 Epoch | 主要市场与特征 Primary Markets & Signatures |
|---|---|---|
| 第一代 Gen 1 | 1996年起 From 1996 | 以韩国国内市场和本土粉丝为主 Anchored in domestic Korean market & local fandom |
| 第二代 Gen 2 | 2007年起 From 2007 | 受众扩展至中国大陆、台湾、香港及东亚 Audience expands to Mainland China, Taiwan, HK & East Asia |
| 第三代 Gen 3 | 2016年起 From 2016 | 《江南Style》与防弹少年团之后进入全球市场 Breakthrough into global markets post-“Gangnam Style” & BTS |
| 第四代 Gen 4 | 2022年起 From 2022 | 市场核心转向新组合，创作参与和运营方式进一步变化 Market core pivots to fresh lineups; deeper creative autonomy & operational shifts |
白皮书认为 2022年是第三代终结之年 ：防弹少年团暂停团体活动，部分三代团解约或解散，叠加疫情与入伍因素，大量组合活动中断；与此同时各公司推出新团，出道三年内的歌手开始获得国内外支持，市场自然进入新老交替。所谓”登顶团 “并非白皮书的讨论重点——它只把某个时代成绩最突出者视为登顶团，并未规定新一代必须超越上一代。真正决定换代的，是主要团体的整体转移与运营模式、影响力的质变，而非出道年份划线。 （信息来源：韩国官方 K-pop 白皮书，经截图转述）
The White Paper designates 2022 as the closing chapter of Gen 3: BTS suspended group activities, several Gen 3 groups disbanded or parted with agencies, compounded by pandemic disruptions and military enlistments halting group promotions. Concurrently, entertainment powerhouses debuted fresh rosters, with artists under three years since debut securing domestic and international acclaim, prompting organic generational succession. The notion of a “pinnacle group” is not the White Paper’s focal debate—it merely identifies peak commercial performers of an era without stipulating that successors must surpass predecessors. What governs generational turnover is the systemic migration of flagship rosters alongside structural leaps in business models and cultural footprint, not calendar debut years. (Source: Official Korean K-Pop White Paper, summarized via screenshots)
白皮书列出的四代代表包括 IVE、aespa、LE SSERAFIM、ITZY、NewJeans、(G)I-DLE、TOMORROW X TOGETHER、ENHYPEN、TREASURE 。这批组合成员多生于21世纪初；音乐制作上，公司专属作曲家、Song Camp 与成员本人共同参与。
The White Paper catalogues Gen 4 luminaries including IVE, aespa, LE SSERAFIM, ITZY, NewJeans, (G)I-DLE, TOMORROW X TOGETHER, ENHYPEN, and TREASURE. These members were predominantly born in the early 2000s; music production mobilizes in-house producers, international song camps, and the idols themselves.
BIGBANG 与防弹少年团时代已有成员参与创作的先例，但第四代的不同在于 参与创作的组合与成员更多 ，且 女性偶像的参与显著突出 ——如 (G)I-DLE 的 昭妍 ，不仅作曲、制作，还在组合概念的建构中表达意见。这使偶像不再只是按公司战略行动的商品，而有机会建立自身认同、形成创作理念，成长为更成熟的音乐人。
While BIGBANG and BTS pioneered idol songwriting, Gen 4 diverges in the sheer breadth of participating groups and members, with female idols’ participation standing out prominently—such as (G)I-DLE’s Soyeon, who composes, produces, and voices opinions in constructing the group’s concept. This shifts idols from packaged commodities executed under corporate marching orders into autonomous artists capable of crystallizing self-identity and maturing into more accomplished musicians.
按此划分，2023年不过是第四代的第二年，K-pop 接下来还可能带来更多惊喜。当然，中国粉圈的划法也有优点：它较好地体现了流行音乐 风格 的快速更迭——比如十年前的性感风被归入中式语境的”三代”，确实更直观。
By this metric, 2023 represents merely the second year of Generation 4, leaving boundless runway for future breakthroughs. Chinese fandom’s micro-taxonomies have utility as well: they keenly map the rapid churn of musical styles—for instance, categorizing the sensual concepts of a decade ago into a distinct generational bracket offers intuitive shorthand.
23年初正式入坑K-pop Formally Entering the K-Pop Fandom in Early 2023
2023 就先不聊女人了，现在感觉混韩泡圈之后对美女已经索然无味了。就是说，以前以为鞠婧祎这种相貌的明星，包括演员、歌手、idol、网红，全中国不会有超过五个。现在接触了Kpop之后，直接是大开眼界。现在我发现我还有很多值得去做的事，只是做什么事都留个心眼，别整个人投入进去了，恋爱是这样，追星是这样，政治是这样，恋爱脑、私生饭、极左极右都不是健康的生活状态。
In 2023, let’s shelve romance; immersing in K-pop has strangely inoculated me against female beauty. Previously, I imagined stars of Ju Jingyi’s aesthetic caliber—actors, idols, influencers—numbered fewer than five across all of China. Plunging into K-pop blew my horizons wide open. I realize myriad worthwhile pursuits beckon, so long as one maintains detached self-awareness: beware pouring your entire soul into anything. Romance, fandom, politics—romantic obsession, sasaeng stalking, ideological fanaticism—are all profoundly unwholesome states of being.
感觉韩国饭圈真的比国内的好点。他们有全国三大电视台的打歌和音源榜单，不像内娱的数据那么容易伪造，所以说那些数据好销量好的一般真的蛮好听。简直是视听盛宴😍😍😍不过好像现在内娱也没啥气候了，禁韩令依旧，一大批明星塌房了，养成类节目都关了。
Korean fandom infrastructure feels distinctly superior to domestic entertainment. Music shows on the three nationwide television networks and transparent digital charts resist brute-force fabrication; chart-toppers and commercial giants generally deliver stellar listening value. A veritable audiovisual banquet 😍😍😍 Meanwhile, domestic entertainment has stalled: the Korean wave ban persists, celebrity scandals implode endlessly, and survival idol competitions remain shuttered.
中韩音乐市场似乎是两个极……韩国有极度完善的娱乐制度，各种榜单、颁奖典礼层出不穷，有巨型娱乐公司进行运作，形成一套完整产业链，但是其市场太小，且内卷严重，导致流水线作词作曲层出不穷，而且越来越脱离音乐讲概念，原因就是拼音乐这条赛道太卷，换概念（如 ai、y2k 等等）来吸引眼球。
China and Korea represent opposite market poles. South Korea boasts an extremely well-developed entertainment system: charts, awards galas, and mega-agencies operating an integrated industrial pipeline; yet its domestic market is tiny and cannibalistic, spawning assembly-line songwriting and conceptual gimmicks (AI lore, Y2K aesthetics) detached from musicality because competing on pure sonic merit is savagely oversaturated.
相反，中国市场极为广阔，在互联网的东风下，只要有一段洗脑的曲子，都能获得流量，有一种劣币驱逐良币的感觉，且本来抖音等短视频平台极为适合新歌的传播（TikTok 的歌曲挑战带火了很多歌），但最后结果是人们的印象变成了新歌都不好听，现在音乐榜单上还是林俊杰周杰伦等等就可以理解了。一方面原因是流媒体的影响反而使中国人对新歌厌恶，另一方面是内地从来没有一个良好的音乐市场环境。
Conversely, China commands a colossal market: algorithmic winds propel any infectious hook into viral virality, inducing a Gresham’s Law where bad money expels the good. Short-form platforms like Douyin should theoretically nurture new music (like TikTok song challenges), yet public perception ossifies into “all new songs are rubbish,” leaving charts dominated by JJ Lin and Jay Chou. Algorithmic noise bred fatigue toward new music, and the mainland never cultivated a healthy, self-sustaining music ecosystem.
从以前的周林陶王，到现在的邓紫棋吴青峰，港台歌手占据了很大一部分内地市场，而近两年的选秀有多糟我们都知道，默默出唱片的优秀歌手也缺乏平台被我们看到。
From the golden era of Jay, JJ, David Tao, and Leehom to today’s G.E.M. and Wu Qing-feng, Hong Kong and Taiwanese artists command the mainland imagination; talent shows over the past two years proved disastrous, while indie talents quietly releasing albums lack platforms to reach the public.
韩国有制度没市场，中国内地有市场没制度。所以说韩国要用组合内加入中国成员等方式打开中国市场，中国学习韩国选秀制度就都可以理解了。（虽然学得很差就是了，基本没过两年就当演员去了）现在看，虽然疫情之后欧美歌坛就一直被嘲笑后继无人，但还是总体最健康的一个市场。
Korea has governance without a market; mainland China has a market without governance. Thus Korea recruits Chinese members to penetrate mainland demographics, while China mimics Korean trainee formats (albeit clumsily, trainees abandoning music for acting within two years). In retrospect, though Western pop has been derided for a talent drought post-pandemic, it remains the healthiest global market.
至于中国音乐，什么时候能有一个权威排行榜再说吧……好像现在公正一点的还是 Billboard 中国榜……虽然说中国音乐资本发展得一直不差，但好像社会层面的音乐现象上次还是周杰伦新专辑……流行音乐缺乏以前的影响力了，市场被一个个小众风格（摇滚、说唱、古风、民谣、乐队、电子）等瓜分了。我觉得这是一个很奇特的现象。
As for Chinese music, wait until an authoritative chart emerges… Currently only Billboard China retains semblance of impartiality. Though domestic entertainment capital thrives, the last monocultural phenomenon was Jay Chou’s album release; pop has surrendered its unifying grip, fragmented into subcultures (rock, rap, gufeng, folk, indie bands, electronic). A curious cultural splintering.
无人登顶：巨星匮乏与全面脱粉 No One Reaches the Summit: The Scarcity of Superstars and Total Defandomization
无人登顶的现象并不只属于 K-pop，而是 全球性的巨星匮乏 。听众的喜好日趋多元，每种风格都能找到自己的受众，昔日全班同学都在讨论 EXO 的盛况已难以复现。
The absence of a definitive summit-reaching group is not unique to K-pop; it reflects a global drought of monocultural superstars. Listener tastes have decentralized; every subgenre carves its own niche, rendering the days when entire classrooms buzzed over EXO an unrepeatable relic.
华语流行同样如此：90后歌手里的顶流至今仍是 邓紫棋 与 华晨宇 ，近七八年出道者中鲜有能与之比肩的，最突出的不过一个 毛不易 。唱片工业时代，市场资源向少数人集中， 杨乃文 二十五岁便可封金曲歌后，如今无人能复制这条路径。但流媒体也带来了另一面： tripleS 这样的小公司团体获得了被听见的机会，若在没有流媒体的年代，她们几乎不可能出头。两个时代，各有利弊。
Mandopop tells the same tale: post-90s commercial apexes remain G.E.M. and Hua Chenyu; across artists debuting over the past seven or eight years, only Mao Buyi has broken through. In the physical CD era, resources consolidated around anointed elites; Faith Yang could be crowned Golden Melody Queen at twenty-five, a trajectory impossible to replicate today. Yet streaming bears an egalitarian upside: small-agency acts like tripleS secure global audiences; without streaming, their debut would have vanished unheard. Two eras, each bearing merits and sorrows.
Apple Music 中国歌曲 Top 10 全是周杰伦 ；Top 50 中，内地歌手仅赵雷 一首。结论只能是”烂完了”——听众决定市场，有什么听众就有什么市场 。YFN问：新生代歌手去哪了？我的回答是：还不错的新人我知道不少，但是没人听 。量级差距摆在那里：新人歌曲在 QQ 音乐一般只有几万收藏，周杰伦的是千万级 ，完全不在一个数量级。
On Apple Music China, the Top 10 is entirely occupied by Jay Chou; within the Top 50, mainland vocalists are represented solely by a single Zhao Lei cut. The conclusion: absolute stagnation—audiences dictate markets; a market reflects the crowd that populates it. YFN asked: where did new-generation artists go? My response: I know quite a few promising newcomers, yet nobody listens. The chasm in scale is insurmountable: fresh indie releases garner tens of thousands of favorites on QQ Music; Jay Chou commands tens of millions, orders of magnitude apart.
榜单还暴露出另一个结构性现象： 中国乐坛男歌手绝对强势 。歌单里的男歌手有周杰伦、王力宏、陶喆、林俊杰、薛之谦、赵雷、郭顶、五月天、方大同、Beyond；女歌手只有邓紫棋、田馥甄、蔡健雅、孙燕姿、王菲—— 清一色港台歌手 ，且除邓紫棋外均已年过四十。我无法理解，为什么年轻人整天听父母辈歌手的歌。这一点在现实中也有印证：模电课上放的歌，英文歌是少数，韩文更不必说，中文歌也全是二十年前成名的老歌手作品。
The charts lay bare another structural reality: the overwhelming hegemony of male artists in Chinese music. Dominant male names include Jay Chou, Wang Leehom, David Tao, JJ Lin, Joker Xue, Zhao Lei, Guo Ding, Mayday, Khalil Fong, and Beyond; female peers are restricted to G.E.M., Hebe Tien, Tanya Chua, Stefanie Sun, and Faye Wong—exclusively Hong Kong and Taiwanese figures, all save G.E.M. now past forty. I cannot fathom why contemporary youth loop music from their parents’ heyday. Offline reality mirrors this: playlist tracks in our Analog Electronics lecture featured scarce English and zero Korean, the Chinese selections consisting entirely of songs from legends who broke out two decades ago.
2025年是我的脱粉之年。 单依纯 上《歌手》之后，滤镜碎了一地； 邓紫棋 出版小说，则再次震碎认知。
The year 2025 was my year of defandomization. Shan Yichun’s appearance on Singer shattered my rose-tinted admiration; G.E.M.’s publication of a novel shattered my cognitive baseline altogether.
邓紫棋的小说中以 牛顿第三定律 比附爱情：既然作用力与反作用力大小相等、方向相反，那么按主角的浪漫解读，”我想念你时，你也同样在想念我”。为了让”谭总爱上我”的剧情不显俗套，作者堆砌了大量物理学与人工智能的名词，宣传语号称 科幻爱情小说 ，内核却是一本烂俗的传教读物——科幻不过是外壳。
G.E.M.’s novel deployed Newton’s Third Law as an allegory for love: since action and reaction are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction, the protagonist romantically deduces, “When I yearn for you, you must be yearning for me in equal measure.” To mask the boilerplate cliché of “CEO Tan falls for me,” the narrative piled up jargon from physics and AI, packaged as a sci-fi romance, yet housing the soul of a mawkish proselytizing tract—science fiction functioning merely as decorative veneer.
我原以为自己对基督教相当宽容，读罢才发现，我的哲学观早已认可 马克思主义哲学 ，对这种试图模糊 唯物与唯心 界限的论调，已经一个字都看不下去。由此断言：我大概不会再粉上内娱的任何人，还是欧美圈和和气气地搞抽象更适合我。
I had fancied myself reasonably tolerant of Christianity, only to realize upon reading that my philosophical worldview firmly aligns with Marxist materialism; I cannot stomach another syllable blurring the line between materialism and idealism. Hence my resolution: I shall never stan another celebrity in domestic entertainment; reveling in good-natured absurdity within Western pop suits me far better.